On 7 July 2006 HRH Prince Amedeo of Savoy, Duke of Aosta, supported by several members of the Savoy family and by leading exponents of two quasi-official organisations associated with his dynasty, declared himself the legal successor of King Umberto II of Italy (who died in exile in 1983). In his declaration and several statements issued with it he states that he, and not his third cousin (Prince Vittorio Emanuele, Duke of Savoy), is the Head of the Royal House of Savoy, asserting that Vittorio Emanuele, only son of King Umberto II, was excluded from the succession based on certain principles of dynastic law (about which more below).

Consistent with this reasoning, he further states that Prince Emanuele Filiberto, son of Vittorio Emanuele, is excluded from the line of succession, and that any official royal act undertaken by Vittorio Emanuele since succeeding His Majesty King Umberto II, including changes to the statutes of the dynastic orders of chivalry and bestowal of honours (investiture of knights and dames), in these is illegal ipso facto, and not to be "recognised." Amedeo has charged his son and heir, Prince Aimone, with the task of "reorganising" the dynastic orders of chivalry. The Duke of Aosta has "assumed" the rank and title "Duke of Savoy," reserved to the head of the dynasty, and explained that he waited decades to make his claim in order not to hinder the Italian Republic's lifting of his cousins' exile, which finally took place in 2002, and because he felt that certain conditions now necessitated this drastic decision. (Conveniently, the much-delayed announcement of Amedeo's claim avoided possible contestation by the late Eugenio of Savoy, Duke of Genoa; it also avoided potential contestation by the late Queen of Italy and by Umberto's Minister of the Royal Household, also now deceased.) By any measure, the existence of rival claimants to headship of one of Europe's oldest dynasties is most unfortunate.

The Head of the House of Savoy since 1983 has been, and remains, Vittorio Emanuele di Savoia (Victor Emmanuel of Savoy). I shall succinctly, but with reasonable completeness, present the reasons for this. These principles are based on actual circumstances and dynastic law rather than questions of personality or alleged events. This article is published independently and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Royal House of Savoy or the Grand Master of its orders of chivalry. It is not intended as a dynastic history. The most complete history of the House of Savoy is Francesco Cognasso's monumental volume I Savoia (unfortunately never published in English). In English there is Denis Mack Smith's Italy and Its Monarchy and Robert Katz's Fall of the House of Savoy, both factually accurate if slightly biased in tone. Amedeo of Aosta's autobiographical In Nome del Re (1986) should be read critically. It is not the author's intention to attack Prince Amedeo of Aosta (who he has met); resolution of a dynastic dispute can only be resolved within the royal family.

Background of the Royal Exile
Dynastic Laws and Succession
Citizenship and the Republic
Quasi-Official Bodies
Conclusions

Background of the Royal Exile
Umberto II reigned briefly following his father's abdication in 1946 and in June of that year was exiled in connection with the referendum establishing the Italian Republic. The 1948 Constitution included an article imposing this exile of the son and other male descendants of the late King of Italy (Vittorio Emanuele III died in exile in Egypt in 1947) as a "transitory" measure which was not repealed until 2002.

King Umberto resided in Portugal during much of his exile, and played an avuncular role in the life of Amedeo, who, like the princes in the line of the Dukes of Genoa (see chart) was allowed to reside in Italy. (The line of the Dukes of Genoa has been extinct since 1996 but under the laws of the Kingdom of Italy the Dukes of Aosta, as descendants of the first King of Italy, actually took precedence over them in the line of succession.) Vittorio Emanuele and his sisters were raised and schooled in Switzerland.

Outside Italy King Umberto II is usually viewed as little more than a footnote to history. He willed the Shroud of Turin, the trust of his family for centuries, to the Catholic Church upon his death, and in fact his wartime sympathies could be described, if with some equivocation, as essentially anti-Fascist (he is thought to have opposed certain of the laws his father was persuaded or constrained to sign). In the end he fully supported the Allies and the cause of liberation. In his own nation he was widely liked; the referendum of 1946 passed only narrowly, and probably with questionable balloting in some quarters.

Dynastic Laws and Succession
In the eleventh century, when the Normans ruled England and half of Italy, the House of Savoy emerged as a family of feudal knights and then counts who guarded important Alpine passes in the interest of the Holy Roman Emperor. From Chambery they established themselves at Turin in the sixteenth century and "Italianised" themselves in language and customs. Early in the eighteenth century the Dukes of Savoy were elevated to the rank of kings (of Sicily and then Sardinia) and between 1848 and 1870 they were a cornerstone of Italian unification. Salic Law has always governed succession and, despite a certain sympathy to Waldensians and Jews (and notwithstanding the occasional excommunication), the dynasty has always been Roman Catholic.

The crux of Amedeo's claim rests with the supposed lacking royal recognition (by King Umberto II) of Vittorio Emanuele's marriage to Marina Ricolfi Doria, a lady of Italian-Swiss ancestry. A number of dynastic laws, some decreed during the twentieth century, make it clear that the prior consent of the king (or dynastic head) is necessary for a prince's marriage to be dynastically valid. In the past even royal princesses requested such permission (of course until the 1940s most royal unions were arranged by parental consent), but Salic Law dictates that all dynasts in the House of Savoy are male; there may be a queen consort but not a reigning queen, as succession is through princes. The laws most often cited are the royal letters patent of 1780 and 1782, which mention that a royal marriage must be "equal" (i.e. a union of the dynast to another royal) to obtain royal consent, and the Italian Civil Code of 1865, 1890 and 1942. The part of the law regarding equal marriages might have been abandoned had the monarchy survived to the present day, while the condition requiring that the spouse be Roman Catholic probably would have been retained for some years, at least into the 1980s when Italy decided that henceforth there would be no state religion. (Elena Petrovich of Montenegro converted from Orthodoxy to wed Vittorio Emanuele III.)

These statutes make it clear that dynasts whose marital unions do not receive prior royal consent are excluded from the line of succession; in practice a royal decree of some kind would be issued to confirm this. The condition of prior consent is pertinent here. Vittorio Emanuele's civil marriages to Marina Doria (in Las Vegas and Geneva) did not enjoy prior approval by King Umberto II. However, following the Catholic wedding in Iran (attended by Queen Maria Jose though not King Umberto), the King and Queen attended festivities in Switzerland marking the occasion. Later, they were godparents of Emanuele Filiberto, who the King made Prince of Venice. Would he have done so if the line of his only son (and heir apparent) were to be excluded from the succession? What is more, no formal declaration in the matter was made, either pro or contro, by King Umberto II. Based on his subsequent actions, though it is clear that King Umberto initially may have entertained certain reservations about his son's marriage, it is apparent that he did not intend to exclude his son from the line of succession.

Falcone Lucifero was Minister of the Royal Household in the last days of the Kingdom of Italy and during King Umberto's long exile. He outlived the King and never made any statement against Prince Vittorio Emanuele or in support of Prince Amedeo as head of the dynasty. The last will and testament of the King makes no mention of it. The late Queen Maria Jose also acknowledged that her son was head of the dynasty, and this does not seem to have been mere maternal partiality. In other words, there is no evidence to support the thesis that in 1983 the succession might have been transmitted to anybody other than Prince Vittorio Emanuele.

The lack of a formal decree, the King's apparent acceptance (albeit after the fact) of Vittorio Emanuele's marriage, and the subsequent (contemporary) acceptance of Vittorio Emanuele's 1983 succession by all concerned, are the principal reasons for continued support of Vittorio Emanuele by many monarchists, historians and others.

It is known that Prince Amedeo enjoyed a good rapport with King Umberto, but there is no clear indication that the latter ever moved to exclude his own son from the succession, despite some vaguely-worded passages in private correspondence which are sometimes construed to that effect, and notwithstanding that Vittorio Emanuele was not named an executor of the King's estate. The mother of Amedeo's son (Aimone) is Claudia of France, and prior royal consent was granted by Umberto, so no succession problem arises there. Amedeo's interpretation of dynastic law has been known to many of us for two decades; it is explained in his book published in Italy in 1986 and the relevant facts are even mentioned in Katz's book, published in 1971 while the King was still alive.

Citizenship and the Republic
Vittorio Emanuele and his son, Emanuele Filiberto, in statements issued before their entry into Italy from exile, expressed their recognition of the Italian Republic and their support of its sovereignty and authority, referring to "our president." No surprise, as this was to be the source of their Italian passports, though the statement was criticised by many as unnecessary because it was never asked of other citizens seeking passports or other rights. Amedeo swore loyalty to the Republic (with Umberto's approval) when he joined the Italian Navy, so it is contradictory to claim that the Duke of Savoy thereby compromised his dynastic position while his cousin did not. This issue really is not very important. The Kingdom of Italy no longer exists to issue passports.

Quasi-Official Bodies
Prince Amedeo's formal declarations explicitly mention a specific quasi-official body, and some supporting statements mention a second. It so happens that both were established in the mid-1950s under King Umberto's auspices but neither enjoys any official role in the function of the dynasty. A third, the family council, is also discussed here.

The Consulta dei Senatori del Regno was a kind of "shadow cabinet" distinguished from the British model by its utter uselessness. Initially, it was composed of dozens of retired or serving men (Italian women couldn't even vote until the 1946 referendum), mostly senators and a few deputies --later the occasional scholar-- who had actually served in the Kingdom of Italy and supported the monarchy's re-establishment, or at least its principles. (In the Kingdom of Italy Senators were appointed by the Crown; deputies were elected.) The Consulta's role was just that: consultative. It was never intended to act as a "king maker" and for the thousand years that the Savoys ruled various dominions (beginning as humble counts of Savoy and ending up as kings of Italy) nothing quite like it was ever deemed necessary because there were, if anything, real senates at the monarchs' disposal. Prince Vittorio Emanuele dissolved it once he was permitted entry into Italy. It seems to have "re-constituted" itself, but the original "senators" are long gone. By the time of Umberto's death, it was essentially an honorary society of loyalists and royalists.

The Corpo della Nobiltà Italiana ostensibly sought to control the use and abuse of titles of nobility in Italy. Of course it had no real legal power, as the new constitution declared nobiliary titles unrecognised (except for use of "predicati" or territorial designations in certain cases). Bogus titles and claims abound in Italy, as elsewhere. The private organisation Collegio Araldico, which publishes the equally unofficial Libro d'Oro, might rely on a finding of the Corpo della Nobiltà, but before long all manner of fantastic "nobles" and their family "histories" were being "recognised." In Italy the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, conversely, relied on its own determinations in these matters, and in the past these were usually reasonably faithful to actual history. By the 1970s, the Corpo della Nobiltà was plagued by problems with which the Consulta Araldica del Regno (Royal College of Arms), until 1948 part of the Interior Ministry, rarely ever had to contend. In the last few years a vocal element in the Corpo della Nobiltà has supported Amedeo's subtle (and now overt) claim to dynastic headship, but they cannot be said to speak for the Italian nobility as a group. In medieval England, King John's barons persuaded him to grant Magna Carta under implicit threat of deposition, but he was a reigning monarch and the barons exercised genuine military and economic power; nobody in Italy has the practical authority to force a man to renounce his identity or incorporeal rights, be they his coat of arms, title of nobility or headship of a royal dynasty.

The Family Council mentioned by Amedeo may be an efficient means of permitting all members of the Savoy family, princesses as well as princes and even non-dynasts (such as the sons of Savoy princesses; Maria Pia's children appertain to the Royal House of Yugoslavia), to participate in dynastic affairs, but it has no precedent in western European dynastic history as a juridical or administrative entity. That said, family support is perhaps more important in non-regnant dynasties than in reigning ones, often as a kind of "witness" to events (such as the fact cited above that Vittorio Emanuele's siblings and cousins did not oppose his succession in 1983), but formalising it in this way gives the impression of support which may be misleading.

In addition to these three quasi-official organisations, there were several monarchist associations, each with its own political or social agenda. After Vittorio Emanuele signed a statement recognising the Italian Republic's right to exist and declaring his loyalty to it, he stated that the material need for monarchist groups did not exist except for purely cultural purposes. Outside Italy, certain Armenian historians and aristocrats regard the Savoys as their royal dynasty de jure.

Conclusions
Unfortunately, a number of non-regnant royal families are divided by dynastic disputes. Those of France, Russia and the Two Sicilies (Bourbons of Naples) readily come to mind. As no authority is empowered to adjudicate such a dispute, these often span generations. Headship disputes may indeed be a normal symptom that plagues royal families which no longer reign, much like the frequent disputes over nobiliary titles between brothers or cousins whose country is no longer a monarchy. As regards the House of Savoy, while an outsider may entertain an opinion, it is important to bear in mind that the present dispute can only be settled in familias. Under present circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Savoyard orders of chivalry will be recognised officially by the Italian government any time soon. These should be considered a special bond between knights (and dames) and the Duke of Savoy. In some dynastic disputes supporters of one dynast or the other have become particularly venomous in their attacks on those supportive of the opposing claimant. It is hoped that this may be avoided out of respect for the Savoy family.